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Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61, 96 P.3d 761 (2004)1
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS
Summary
Appeal from a district court order denying appellant’s post-conviction petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to consider whether the district court’s entry of an amended judgment of
conviction provided good cause to extend the one-year limitation set forth in NEV. REV. STAT.
34.726(1) for filing a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Disposition/Outcome
The district court’s order denying the post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus
was affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
On January 7, 1998, Sullivan pleaded guilty to one count each of robbery, burglary, and
possession of stolen property. The original judgment of conviction contained a clerical error
because it mistakenly pronounced Sullivan guilty of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon,
when Sullivan had only pleaded guilty to simply robbery. On appeal, the judgment of conviction
was confirmed, but the case was remanded to the district court in order to correct the mistake. A
corrected judgment of conviction was entered on January 3, 2000 before the remittitur from the
Nevada Supreme Court to correct the judgment issued on January 10, 2000.
On May 10, 001, Sullivan filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The State moved to dismiss the petition because it was untimely. However, the parties then
decided to stipulate that Sullivan’s supplemental petition should be treated as timely because it
was filed within one year of the when the amended judgment was actually entered. The petition
was ultimately denied after the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and this appeal by
Sullivan followed.
Discussion
Even though the timeliness of the filing of the petition had been stipulated to by the
parties, the Nevada Supreme Court discussed whether Sullivan’s post-conviction habeas petition
was procedurally barred. The court first looked to NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) which provides
that a timely post-conviction habeas petition “must be filed within 1 year after entry of the
judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the
Supreme Court issues its remittitur.” There is no language in the statute that addresses whether
the one-year time period restarts if the judgment of conviction is amended. Therefore, the court
found that to provide an extended period of time under NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726 would create an
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absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.2 A district court may amend a
judgment years and even decades after the original judgment of conviction is entered which
would then restart the one-year time period. This would undermine the doctrine of finality of
judgments by providing virtually no end to the filing of post-conviction habeas petitions.
When the Nevada Legislature enacted NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726, the “overall spirit was
one of limiting habeas petitioners to one time through the [post-conviction] system absent
extraordinary circumstances.”3 Therefore, NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) requires that claims
presented in an untimely post-conviction habeas petition must be dismissed as procedurally
barred “unless there is good cause shown for the delay.”4 Sullivan failed to show good reason
for the delay in filing the petition. Here, the claims were not related to and did not contest the
clerical correction contained in the amended judgment of conviction. Instead, they all arose
during the original proceedings and thus they could have been raised in a timely petition filed on
or before January 10, 2001 which is one year after the Nevada Supreme Court issued the
remittitur in the direct appeal. Therefore, the petition was improperly treated as timely under
NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726 simply because it was filed within one year of the entry of the amended
judgment of conviction notwithstanding the stipulation that the petition would be allowed
entered into by both parties.
Conclusion
The district court denied Sullivan’s petition for habeas corpus and the Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed, stating that the petition was untimely because it was filed approximately 14
months after the supreme court had issued a remittitur in the inmate’s direct appeal. Thus, the
petition was improperly treated as timely under NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726 simply because it was
filed within one year of the entry of the amended judgment. Additionally, even it the petition
had been timely filed, Sullivan’s petition lacked merit because his guilty pleas were knowing and
voluntary and his counsel was not ineffective.
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See Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (1998).
Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 875, 34 P.3d 519, 529 (2001).
4
NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) provides in pertinent part that “For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for
delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court: (a) That the delay is not the fault of the
petitioner; and (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.
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